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CHAPTER 7 
Commercial Law 
DAVID W. CARROLL 
§7.1. Introduction. In recognition of the manifold nature of the 
decisions treated in this chapter- the diversity of issues presented by 
each case- the organizational structure departs somewhat from the 
traditional SuRVEY format. The amenability of the following decisions 
to analysis from several distinct, though inevitably related, perspectives 
places particular emphasis upon the individual section headings under 
which a given case is discussed. 
§7.2. Uniform Commercial Code: Judicial disregard where ap· 
plicable: Failure to apply Code principles by analogy. Disregard 
of the Uniform Commercial Code1 in cases to which it properly ap-
plies and misapplication of the Code when it is the applicable law 
selected by the court2 are two errors which recur with troubling 
frequency in Massachusetts cases of commercial consequence. Apt 
illustration is furnished by Regina Grape Products Co. v. Supreme 
Wine Co.s and a companion case,4 in which a California wine seller 
claimed loss of profit resulting from failure of the Massachusetts buyer 
to purchase the amount of wine contractually stipulated, and in which 
the buyer sued for damages for breach of warranty of the wine's 
quality. Both claims were based upon breach of a contract for the sale 
of wine made in 1963. A preliminary conflict of laws issue was soundly 
resolved with the decision that Massachusetts law obtained. Proceeding 
upon the unquestionable premise that the transaction was a contract 
for the sale of goods falling within the scope of Article 25 of the Code, 
the Supreme Judicial Court cited the warranty sections in finding an 
express warranty by sample, 6 an implied warranty of fitness for a 
DAVID W. CARROLL is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and a mem-
ber of the Bars of Ohio and Massachusetts. 
§7.2. 1 The UCC was enacted as Chapter 106 of the Massachusetts General Laws. 
As corresponding section numbers are identical, all future references, unless other-
wise indicated, are to the 1962 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
2 See, e.g., 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §7.1 for an illustrative discussion noting 
General Electric Co. v. United States Dynamics, Inc., 403 F.2d 933 (1st Cir. 1968). 
8 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 945, 260 N.E.2d 219. 
4 Supreme Wine Co. v. Regina Grape Products, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 945, 260 
N.E.2d 219. 
5 UCC §§2-102, 2-105 and 2-106(1). 
6 Id. §2-313(l)(c). 
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particular purpose,7 and an implied warranty of merchantability.8 In-
explicably, however, the Code is nowhere mentioned in the Court's 
discussion of issues raised by the parol evidence rule, the requirement 
that buyer notify seller of breach of warranty, or the remedies which 
inure to an aggrieved buyer upon breach of warranty arising out of 
an installment sales contract. Each of these legal problems is expressly 
covered by Code provisions; 9 and, significantly, the Code principles 
relating to these problems are, in many instances, different from antece-
dent common law contract principles. The probability that the out-
come of the Regina case would not have been changed by appropriate 
application of apposite Code sections should not obscure the im-
portance of analytically substituting express and controlling provisions 
of Article 2 for common law contract principles which ceased to ob-
tain in Massachusetts with the 1958 enactment of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. The changes engendered by such enactment should 
not be ignored, especially 12 years after the Code's adoption. 
Manganaro Drywall, Inc. v. Penn-Simon Construction Co.10 presents 
the opposite side of the conceptual problem raised by the Regina 
decision, to wit: the application of Article 2 principles to transactions 
which are clearly outside the scope of the article on sales. The principal 
case arose out of the breach of a compromise agreement regarding the 
amount due to plaintiff subcontractor for work and materials furnished 
in construction of several buildings. The compromise agreement 
provided for payment of the amount agreed to be due in installments 
without interest; but, if the contractor or surety should default in 
paying any installment, the remaining principal, plus interest at the 
rate of 6 percent per year (from the date of completion of performance) 
on the total amount agreed upon, would become immediately due and 
payable. The Supreme Judicial Court considered solely the issue of 
whether the provision for interest payment was unconscionable as 
alleged. While the compromise agreement was not helld within the 
ambit of Article 2,11 and the Court did not refer to Section 2-30212 of 
7 ld. §2-315. 
8 Id. §2·314. 
9 UCC §2-202 (parol evidence rule); UCC §2-607(3)(a) (notification of breach of 
warranty); UCC §2-612 (installment contracts); UCC §§2-711 through 2-717 (buyer's 
remedies). For further discussion of these issues, see §§7.3, 7.5 and §7.6 infra. 
10 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 969, 260 N.E.2d 182. 
11 See note 5 supra. The plaintiff apparently was a drywall installer. It seems 
highly improbable that the sale and installation of drywall in connection with a 
building construction project would be characterized as a tram:action in goods 
within the scope of Article 2. 
12 UCC §2-302 provides: 
"(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract to have !been unconscion-
able at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may 
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may 
limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable 
result. 
"(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause 
2
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the Code, it nonetheless seems reasonable to conclude that the Court 
resolved the issue using the unconscionability principles of Article 2 
by analogy. Such is a salutary common law approach,13 and expansion 
of Code application by analogy indeed was intended by its draftsmen.14 
The remaining problem, however, is that the Court did not explicitly 
recognize or analyze the legislative analogy question. It is submitted 
that the Court should have considered the legislative purpose and 
policy in enacting Section 2-302, the current societal values which it 
reflects, and the comparability of the instant case to those factual 
settings to which the section directly applies.15 The not uncommon 
failure of the courts to thoroughly analyze the analogy issue should be 
avoided in the future. 
§7.3. UCC Article 2: Parol evidence rule. The written portion of 
the contract for sale of wine in Regina Grape Products Co. v. Supreme 
Wine Co.l provided: 
Since the time we started purchasing from you, a few years ago, 
we have used only your wine, even though we could have made 
purchases at a lesser price. However, recently we have been ap-
proached by more than one reputable firm with a $.47 per gallon 
price. I am not asking that you meet the above quoted price. I am 
willing to pay you $.52Y2 per gallon for 125,000 gallons of Red 
Dry Wine. If this is acceptable please ship 8,000 gallons im-
mediately. Please notify either way. Would you please indicate 
that this is agreeable to you by placing your signature below.2 
Both buyer and seller signed the writing. Prior to consummation of 
the contract in issue, the seller had furnished wine of satisfactory 
quality to the buyer over a period of more than 18 months; the 
buyer's president had supplied samples of wine of desired color and 
quality to seller; and the parties had negotiated quality and color 
standards. The first shipment of wine under the new contract was 
unsatisfactory and the buyer complained. Subsequently, buyer notified 
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable op-
portunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid 
the court in making the determination." 
It could be argued that this section has broader application because it uses the 
term "contract" rather than "contract for sale"; however, this is a doubtful 
contention. See UCC §2-I06. 
13 See Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 385 (1908). 
14 UCC § 1-102, Comment I; see also 1954 New York Law Revision Commission 
Report, General Statement to the Commission by Professor Karl N. Llewellyn, 
vol. I, pp. I9 et seq. 
15 See Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 Colum. 
L. Rev. 653, 664 (1957). 
§7.3. 1 I970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 945, 260 N.E.2d 2I9. 
2 Id. at 946, 260 N.E.2d at 220. Interesting problems involving the proper mode of 
acceptance, and silence as acceptance, raised by this letter were not treated in the 
decision. 
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seller that the second shipment was satisfactory but that succeeding 
shipments were unsatisfactory. Buyer protested to seller and com-
menced the purchase of wine from another winery. The Supreme 
Judicial Court, without referring to UCC Section 2-202, held that 
parol evidence was admissible to establish the agreed color and quality 
of the wine because the writing was ambiguous and effected only a 
partial integration of the contract. The Court also stated that buyer's 
complaints were based upon prior negotiations, purchases and samples. 
The relevance of this latter statement to the operation of the parol 
evidence rule, as determined by the Court, is difficult to ascertain. 
It is submitted that the Court should have adverted to UCC Section 
2-202, which provides: 
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of 
the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing 
intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement 
with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be 
contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a con-
temporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supple-
mented 
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section l-205) or by 
course of performance (Section 2-208); and 
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court 
finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and 
exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement. 
Evidence as to the proper color and quality of the dry red wine to be 
sold would not "contradict" any term of the writing. The previous 
purchases constitute a course of dealing'~ and the shipments under the 
contract in issue, together with buyer's notices and complaints, 
establish a course of performance.4 It could convincingly be argued, 
moreover, that negotiations as to quality of the wine would also be 
admissible because neither party intended the writing to be the "com-
plete and exclusive statement. .. .''5 Therefore, the course of dealing, 
course of performance and oral agreements reached in previous nego-
tiations are admissible under Section 2-202 to explain the meaning of 
"Dry Red Wine"6 and to supplement the writing. 
3 UCC §1-205(1) provides: "A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct 
between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as 
establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions 
and other conduct." 
4 UCC §2-208(1) provides: "Where the contract for sale involves repeated oc-
casions for performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the 
performance and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of per-
formance accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine 
the meaning of the agreement." 
5 UCC §2·202, Comment 3. 
6 Comment 2 to UCC §2-202 states in part: "Unless carefully negated ... [course 
of dealing and course of performance] have become an element of the meaning of 
4
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It should be noted that the Court properly received evidence of the 
sample furnished by the buyer's president. The parol evidence rule 
should rarely exclude evidence of an express warranty by sample.7 
Perhaps the only instance of justified exclusion occurs when war-
ranties by sample are expressly negated in writing. The parol evidence 
rule has no applicability to the implied warranties of fitness and 
merchantability. The related inquiry with respect to these warranties 
asks whether they have been excluded or limited in the manner 
prescribed by the Code.s 
§7.4. Unconscionability. In Manganaro Drywall, Inc. v. Penn-
Simon Construction Co.,1 the Supreme Judicial Court provided helpful 
guidelines in determining the pertinent factors which bear upon anal-
yses of unconscionability. Concededly a case outside the technical 
purview of Article 2, Manganaro Drywall involved a contract compro-
mising the amount due for services and materials furnished in several 
building construction projects. The sole issue presented to the Court 
was whether a clause providing for retroactive interest on the total 
compromise sum in the event of failure to pay any installment was 
unconscionable and contrary to public policy.2 The Court, in sus-
taining the legality of the clause, indicated that the undefined term, 
unconscionable, assumes both a procedural and substantive content.3 
The procedural content involves the bargaining, negotiating, and 
drafting phases of the contractual process. In this regard, the Court 
considered the following factors: (1) fraud; (2) overreaching; (3) breach 
of a fiduciary relationship; (4) conduct of negotiations on an arm's-
length basis; (5) relative bargaining power of the parties (here, two 
substantial business firms); (6) clarity of the terms of the clause; and 
(7) inadvertence.4 The Court does not separate these factors in its 
the words used." It is also possible that a usage of trade in the wine business might 
establish the color and quality of "Dry Red Wine," but no evidence of usage 
seems to have been presented. See UCC §1-205(2). 
7 See UCC §§2-313(1)(c), 2-316(1) and 2-317. The use of the parol evidence rule 
to exclude evidence of an express warranty by sample in General Elec. Co. v. 
United States Dynamics, Inc., 403 F.2d 933 (ht Cir. 1968), noted in 1969 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §7.1, was very disturbing. 
8 See UCC §§2-302, 2·316 and 2-719. This was a commercial transaction but, in 
the future, it will be impossible to exclude the implied warranty of merchantability 
and the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose covered by Acts of 
1970, c. 880, amending G.L., c. 106, by inserting §2-316A, discussed in Chapter 9. 
§7 .4. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 969, 260 N.E.2d 182. 
2 According to the decision, the clause was not a penalty clause. Defendant sought 
to argue inadvertent failure to include necessary language in the clause, but his 
attempt was rejected because the argument was not made at trial. . 
3 See Leff, Unconscionability and the Code- The Emperor's New Clause, 115 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 485; 489, 509 (1967). 
4 See note 2 supra. The Court failed to explicitly relate inadvertence to the issue 
of unconscionability. Its significance as a factor, however, should not be minimized 
since it merited mention by the Court and since it might be germane to uncon-
scionability in at least two respects, to wit: lack of awareness of the clause or its 
5
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treatment of the unconscionability issue and, certainly, they are in 
many instances interrelated. 
The substantive unconscionability issue, on the other hand, turns on 
whether the retroactive interest charge constituted an excessively 
disproportionate potential price to be paid by the defendant for the 
concessions made by the plaintiff in the compromise.5 The Court based 
its determination that the price was not unconscionable on three 
findings: 
(1) Prior to the settlement negotiations and agreement, the plaintiff 
was entitled to interest on the entire principal sum from the date 
stipulated in the retroactive interest clause. 
(2) The difference between the interest charges, depending upon 
whether or not the installment payments were considered in relation 
to the total transaction, were not so disproportionate to the damages 
caused by the defendant's breach of the agreement "that iit amounts to 
a penalty."6 The retroactive clause may well be closely analogous to a 
liquidated damages clause. However, care should be taken in deciding 
that the "liquidated damages-penalty" cases are applicable to a de-
termination of whether the contested price is unconscionable. Tradi-
tionally, the view has been that the parties' freedom to fix the price 
is substantially greater than their power to agree to future damages. 
Price is one of the central terms which is usually the product of care-
ful deliberation by both parties to the agreement. Perhaps, if the 
price were hidden by "easy monthly payments" language or similar 
camouflage, the penalty cases might be instructive. 
(3) The mere fact that the interest rate exceeded the legal rate of 6 
percent per year while not being usurious did not render the contract 
unconscionable or repugnant to public policy. 
While the Court in Manganaro Drywall did not expressly distinguish 
between substantive and procedural unconscionability, the case 
provides the practitioner with useful guidance on the legal import of 
unconscionability in Massachusetts. 
§7.5. Warranties: Products liability: Cases .and legislation. The 
case of Necktas v. General Motors Corp.1 contains a catalog of the 
continuing horrors of Massachusetts products liability law.2 Envision 
an action for property damage and the death of the plaintiff's son 
resulting from an automobile accident occurring in 1962 still lingering 
meaning, and failure to include proper language to render the intention(s) of the 
parties clear. 
5 For other cases considering excessive price as a measure of unconscionability, 
see American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maciver, 105 N.H. 435·, 201 A.2d 886 
(1964); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 
1969). 
6 Manganaro Drywall, Inc. v. Penn-Simon Constr. Co., 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 969, 
973, 260 N.E.2d 182, 185. 
§7.5. 11970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 843, 259 N.E.2d 234. 
2 See 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1.1. 
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in the courts in 1970, and the result of the Supreme Judicial Court's 
decision: another trial. Taking a strict view of the plaintiff's burden of 
establishing the negligence of each defendant, General Motors' Pontiac 
Division and the dealer from whom the allegedly defective automobile 
was purchased, the Court failed to even consider the possibility of im-
posing strict liability in tort.3 Furthermore, the majority Gustice 
Spiegel dissenting in an opinion joined by Justice Kirk) severely 
construed Massachusetts' archaic and absurd wrongful death statute4 
by ruling that no recovery for wrongful death may be based upon 
breach of warranty. And finally, the obdurate doctrine of privity of 
contract in personal injury-products liability cases, successfully as-
saulted in other jurisdictions, has survived another test in the Massa-
chusetts courts. This is indeed a discouraging state of affairs in a state 
which, in many respects, has become the national leader in consumer 
protection. 
One of the more heartening signs, however, materialized during the 
1970 legislative session, which saw the adoption of the following act: 
The provisions of section 2-316 [permitting the exclusion or 
modification of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness 
in specified circumstances] shall not apply to sales of consumer 
goods, services, or both. Any language, oral or written, used by a 
seller or manufacturer of consumer goods and services, which at-
tempts to exclude or modify any implied warranties of merchant-
ability and fitness for a particular purpose or to exclude or modify 
the consumer's remedies for breach of those warranties, shall be 
unenforceable. 
Any language, oral or written, used by a manufacturer of con-
sumer goods, which attempts to limit or modify a consumer's 
remedies for breach of such manufacturer's express warranties, 
shall be unenforceable, unless such manufacturer maintains 
facilities within the commonwealth sufficient to provide reason-
able and expeditious performance of the warranty obligations. 
[Emphasis added.]5 
This legislation effectively prohibits disclaimers of the implied war-
ranties of fitness and merchantability, and it presumably disallows 
limitations of recoverable remedies resulting from breaches thereof. 
The statute also restricts repair and replacement limitation clauses 
on express warranties to situations in which the seller maintains an 
authorized repair center within the Commonwealth. Unfortunately, 
the new section does not squarely address the doctrine of privity of 
3 See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965); 
Santor v. Karaghensian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Greeno v. Clark 
Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965). 
4 G.L., c. 229. 
5 Acts of 1970, c. 880, amending G.L., c. 106, by inserting §2-316A. 
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contract. Legislation should be introduced and enacted abolishing 
privity of contract in products liability cases and adopting a modern 
wrongful death statute. The common law process in Massachusetts is 
evidently unlikely to eliminate, or significantly circumscribe, the 
privity doctrine; and it would be an exercise in strained statutory 
interpretation to render a liberal construction of the existing wrongful 
death statute. 
In another case, discussed earlier in another light, Regina Grape 
Products Co. v. Supreme Wine Co.,6 the Supreme Judicial Court nicely 
handled the distinctions among an express warranty by sample,7 the 
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose,8 and the implied 
warranty of merchantability.9 The facts of the case also serve to under-
score the need for the buyer to give the seller prompt :notice of the 
breach of warranty.1o 
§7.6. Buyer's remedies. Although the Massachusetts Commercial 
Code received no mention on the remedies issue in Regina Grape 
Products Co. v. Supreme Wine Co,,l the Supreme Judicial Court held 
that the buyer who had received several defective shipments under a 
contract for the sale of wine could cancel the contract, buy wine else-
where, and recover from the original seller the difference between the 
value of the wine promised and the value of the wine delivered, plus 
buyer's loss of profit. The opinion does not indicate whether the lost 
profits correspond to the whole contract, or only to the installments 
made up to the time of concellation, or only to future installments. 
There is no discussion of the right to cancel a contract and still recover 
damages. It might have been hoped that the Court would have 
decided whether the defaults in the previous installments had sub-
stantially impaired the value of the whole contract; such a determina-
tion properly precedes any finding of breach of the whole contract.2 
Only then would the inquiry devolve upon how the appropriate 
remedial provisions apply to the complete breach of an installment 
contract where a portion of the goods has been delivered and accepted 
while another portion remains undelivered. It is arguable that the con-
tract should be severed for application of the Code's remedial sections, 
with UCC Section 2-7143 pertaining to the accepted goods and Sections 
6 1970 Mass. Adv, Sh. 945, 260 N.E.2d 219. 
7 UCC §1·313(l)(c). 
8 Id. §2-315. 
9 Id. §2-314. 
1.o Id. §2-607(3)(a). 
§7.6. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 945, 260 N.E.2d 219. 
2 ucc §2·612(3). 
3 UCC §2·714 provides: 
"(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification (subsection (3) 
of Section 2-607) he may recover as damages for any non-conformity of tender the 
loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as de-
termined in any manner which is reasonable, 
8
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2-711 through 2-713 applying to the future installments. Had such an 
analysis been undertaken in the present case, the buyer would have 
been entitled to the difference between "the value of the goods accepted 
and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted .... "4 
The lost profits could have been recovered as stemming from "special 
circumstances"5 or as consequential damages.a Admittedly, a problem 
of double recovery may possibly arise where the buyer recovers both 
value and profits. However, in Regina Grape Products, it is clear that 
the auditor used wholesale value in his assessment, since value and 
contract price were equal and any profit accruing to plaintiff would 
have resulted from retail sales. 
It is not clear from the opinion, however, whether any of the lost 
profits recovered were attributable to future installments due after 
buyer's cancellation. Buyer did acquire wine from other sources, and 
the facts indicated that wine of the same quality may have been avail-
able at prices equal to or below the contract price. The Code does 
indicate that a buyer who rejects, or revokes his acceptance of, the 
goods may cancel the contract, recover the price paid, and either cover 
or recover damages.7 The cover remedy is apparently not mandatory, 
and the fact that the buyer acquired wine from other sources would 
presumably not bar him from bringing an action for damages under 
Section 2-713.8 However, if the buyer in fact entered into an extremely 
advantageous "cover" contract, his ability to do so would militate in 
favor of a de minimis damage recovery. The opinion of Justice 
Reardon seems consistent with Code principles, but it is unfortunate 
that the decision did not analyze the directly applicable Code sections 
and acknowledge, if not discuss, the variety of interesting issues 
presented. 
§7.7. Depositary bank as holder in due course. Several aspects 
of the First Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in Bowling Green, Inc. 
v. State Street Bank & Trust Co.l are troubling: omissions in the deci-
sion, the basic legal assumptions made, and the ultimate result. Plain-
tiff, the operator of a bowling alley, negotiated to Bowl-Mor, Inc. a 
United States Government check in the amount of $15,306 as the first 
"(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time 
and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value 
they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances 
show proximate damages of a different amount. 
"(3) In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under the next 
section may also be recovered." 
4 UCC §2-714(2). See note 3 supra. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Id. §§2-714(3), 2-715. 
7 Id. §2-71 1. 
8 Id. §§2-71l(l)(a), (b) and 2-712. 
§7.7. 1425 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1970), aff'g 307 F. Supp. 648 (D. Mass. 1969). See 
Note, 12 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 282 (1970). 
9
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installment on a conditional sales contract for candlepin-setting ma-
chines; such machines were never delivered to plaintiff. On the fol-
lowing day, a Bowl-Mor representative deposited the check in account 
with defendant bank. (No evidence was adduced as to whether Bowl-
Mor supplied its own endorsement). At the time of the deposit, Bowl-
Mor's account with the bank was overdrawn by more than $5000. Bowl-
Mor was further indebted to the bank on other loans covered by 
perfected security interests on Bowl-Mor's chattel paper and the 
proceeds thereo£.2 Upon learning that Bowl-Mor, later that day, had 
filed a petition for reorganization to Chapter X of the Bankruptcy 
Act,3 depositary bank immediately credited the check against the over-
draft, leaving a balance in Bowl-Mor's account of $10,000. The evidence 
at trial established that the bank was aware of its depo::iitor's serious 
financial problems, as previous loans totaling $2 million to Bowl-Mor 
had been written off as bad debts.4 In addition, the bank was one of 
Bowl-Mor's three major creditors; an officer of the bank had served as 
a director of Bowl-Mor up to about a month before the transaction in 
question; and the overdraft and deposit of the Government check in-
volved, to the bank's knowledge, a continuing struggle by Bowl-Mor 
to meet its payroll obligations.0 
Plaintiff Bowling Green, in the district court, attempted to hold de-
fendant bank as a constructive trustee of the proceeds of the check, 
which, inexplicably, was not introduced in evidence. The United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found in favor of 
the defendant, holding that the bank was a holder in due course of 
the check; the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
affirmed. 
As indicated earlier, there are two troubling omissions in the case: 
(1) the disputed check was not a part of the evidence, and (2) the ap-
pellate court opinion failed to discuss the possibility that the depositary 
bank had a perfected security interest in the item as proceeds under 
its floating lien.a Defendant bank had the burden of proving its 
alleged status as a holder in due course.7 It is axiomatic that one may 
only be a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument. Since the 
check was not introduced, the court evidently presumed that all checks 
2 It would seem reasonable to assume that defendant bank had checked the 
proceeds box in the financing statement which it filed. See UCC: §9-306(3)(a). If 
this were true, one might validly argue that the account constituted identifiable 
noncash proceeds, as described by UCC §9-306(4)(a), or that the: account would 
be subject to the ten-day rule of UCC §9-306(d)(ii). 
3 II U.S.C. §§501 et seq. (1964). It should be noted that the events which 
transpired after the bank had notice of the Chapter X petition are irrelevant to 
the bank's status as a holder in due course. 
4 307 F. Supp. 648, 656 (D. Mass. 1969). 
li Id. at 657. 
6 See note 2 supra. 
7 425 F.2d 81, 83 (lst Cir. 1970). See UCC §3-307(3). 
10
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are negotiable instruments.8 More severe difficulties are raised by the 
check's absence in evidence at trial.9 How the check was made out- to \ 
plaintiff as sole payee or to plaintiff and Bowl-Mor as joint payees- is 
an important but unanswered question. Nor is it known whether the 
United States Government check expressly required payee's endorse-
ment, whether Bowl-Mor endorsed in blank or specially,10 or whether 
the check was properly stamped by the bank in order to supply its 
customer's missing endorsement.!! It seems doubtful that defendant 
could sustain its burden of proof in establishing its status as a holder 
in due course without introducing the check.12 
In affirming the district court opinion in Bowling Green, the court 
of appeals arrived at three central legal conclusions: (1) a depositary-
collecting bank need not be a holder in order to be a holder in due 
course; (2) the bank's security interest, referred to in UCC Section 
4-209 for purposes of giving value, includes all of the bank's security 
interests and not simply that provided for in Section 4-208; and (3) the 
record did not contain sufficient evidence of fraud or bad faith on the 
part of defendent bank to overturn the trial court's finding of good 
faith. 
The first conclusion is erroneous. According to UCC Section 3-302(1), 
a "holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument .... " 
(Emphasis added.) Nothing in Article 4 eliminates that requirement. 
The court failed to recognize the basic assumption in Article 4 that the 
collecting bank may assume a dual role, to wit, that of agent and that 
of holder.13 The fact that the bank is a collecting agent does not neces-
sarily make it a holder. Section 4-205(1), which gives the bank a power 
of attorney to supply the customer's missing endorsement either by 
signature or by statement (rather than eliminating the requirement 
that the bank be a holder), accentuates the necessity of negotiation for 
the bank to acquire holder in due course status. While the court of ap-
peals also relied upon Section 4-209,14 this section merely refers to the 
value requirement of holder in due course status15 and in no way 
modifies any of the other elements. Furthermore, the court's state-
ment that the bank was a holder because it took from a holder is 
tellingly significant in its inaccuracy.16 And, finally, the close rela-
8 Since checks are almost always printed and in simple form, such a presumption 
may not be unreasonable. 
9 See UCC §2-202. Concededly, the definition of a holder in UCC §1-201(20) is 
vague, but it seems reasonable to conclude that one must take by negotiation in 
order to be a holder. 
10 ucc §§3-202, 3-204. 
11 Id. §4-205. 
12 It is submitted that, had the check been destroyed or otherwise unavailable, 
the court might have taken a different view. 
13 See UCC §4-201(1). 
14 425 F.2d 81, 86 (1st Cir. 1970). 
111 UCC §3-302(1)(a). 
16 UCC §3-201(1) provides: "Transfer of an instrument vests in the transferee 
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tionship between the bank and Bowl-Mor at least raised the possibility 
of applying the consumer law and holder in due course statutes17 to 
the present case by legislative analogy. Even if the decision is accepted, 
it should be strictly limited to instances in which the only factor dis-
qualifying the bank as a holder is the absence of its customer's en-
dorsement.ts 
The conclusion of the court of appeals that the general security 
interest under the floating lien constituted value is likewise question-
able. It, too, stems from the court's failu.re to carefully consider the 
bank's agency status. Article 4 predicates the rights of coHecting banks 
upon the theory that they remain collecting agents until final pay-
ment.19 If the bank, prior to final payment, permits withdrawals or 
gives a credit for withdrawal as of right, the bank takes a security in-
terest to the extent of the withdrawal or credit.2o Such an interest is 
essential to the theory of continuing agency, as contrasted with a 
theory which would hold the bank an owner of the item to the extent 
that it has permitted withdrawals or given final credit. Section 4-209, 
read in the light of the agency theory, would probably be limited to 
the security interest described by Section 4-208. An interesting and 
pertinent inquiry would be whether defendant bank gave credit for 
withdrawal as of right on United States Government checks. In any case, 
if the bank did not enjoy a priority security interest under the 
proceeds section of Article 9,21 it would appear that the bank would 
have no claim to the $10,000 in excess of the overdraft even if it 
qualified as a holder, 
It deserves mention that the court of appeals correctly held that the 
"good faith" test for holder in due course status in Massachusetts is 
subjective,22 and that the handling of checks of, and extension of loans 
to, a business which the bank knew to be insolvent did not constitute 
fraud or bad faith.28 Banks must be allowed wide business judgment 
in dealing with marginal or insolvent businesses. Should a bank, how-
ever, continue to prop up a hopelessly insolvent concern to the detri-
ment of third parties, it would then seem defensible, in some instances, 
to hold that such conduct amounts to fraud and bad faith. 
§7.8. UCC Article 9: Assignee of private construction contract vs. 
surety on payment bond. Assuming that the United States Court 
such rights as the transferor has therein. . . ." It is the plaintiff, nCtt the defendant, 
who is contending that defendant bank is in the same position as .Bowl-Mor. 
l'f G.L., c. 255D, §§24, 25. 
18 If the bank, for example, were disqualified as a holder because an endorse-
ment necessary to negotiation prior to reception of the check by the bank's 
customer had been forged, the bank would not then become a holder in due 
course. See UCC §~3-202, 3-204 and 3-404. 
19 See UCC ~4-201 and Comment thereto. 
20 ucc §4-208. 
21 See note 2 supra. 
22 425 F.2d 81, 85 (1st Cir. 1970). See UCC §1-201(19). 
23 Id. at 85, 86. 
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of Appeals for the First Circuit has properly interpreted Massachusetts 
law, the surety on both payment and performance bonds- whether 
the construction contract be governmental or private- will prevail, 
to the extent of the funds held by the owner at the time of the con-
tractor's default, over an assignee of the contract. Under the principle 
of equitable subrogation, this result obtains even though the assignee 
perfected the assignment under UCC Article 9 prior to the time at 
which any rights attached to the surety. In Framingham Trust Co. v. 
Gould-National Batteries, lnc.,l plaintiff bank, pursuant to Article 9, 
perfected an assignment of all the present and future accounts 
receivable and contract rights of a building contractor who agreed to 
construct a factory addition for Gould-National Batteries, Inc. for 
$133,000. Five months later, defendant surety company issued payment 
and performance bonds on the private construction contract on which 
the contractor defaulted. Under the performance bond, the surety 
completed the project with an expenditure of approximately $3000; 
under the payment bond, the surety paid uncompensated laborers and 
suppliers who were not entitled to mechanics' liens to the extent of 
some $50,000. At the time of default, the owner, Gould-National, whose 
status in the action was that of stakeholder, held an unpaid balance in 
the approximate amount of $22,000.2 As the bank conceded the 
surety's priority to the $3000 paid under the performance bond,s the 
sole dispute turned on whether the surety also had priority to amounts 
expended under the payment bond to persons who apparently failed 
to perfect liens under G.L., c. 254, §4. 
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
decided in plaintiff bank's favor, holding that a surety on a private 
contract could share in withheld payments in owner's hands only to 
the extent of completion costs while not entitled to priority on sums 
paid under the payment bond.4 The court reasoned that subrogation 
by the surety to the position of the laborers and materialmen would 
not benefit the surety, since neither the laborers nor the materialmen 
had claims directly against the owner or rights under the mechanics' 
lien law. The court also concluded that the owner "had no rights 
under Massachusetts law to which the surety might be subrogated 
under the doctrine of equitable subrogation" because the owner had 
no right to pay the laborers directly.5 
~7.8. 1427 F.2d 856 (lst Cir. 1970), rev'g 307 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Mass. 1969). 
2 Although not expressly so stated, the sum must have included amounts both 
already earned and due, as well as retainages. 
3 See National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 
843, 848 (1st Cir. 1969). 
4 See Note, 31 Fordham L. Rev. 161 (1962), which indicates that New York makes 
a similar distinction between payment and performance bonds. 
5 307 F. Supp. 1008, 1013 (D. Mass. 1969). It is sometimes suggested that 
governmental contracts differ from private contracts with respect to payment 
bonds in that laborers and materialmen are not entitled to file mechanics' liens 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed 
the district court decision, finding no compelling difference between 
the equitable right of the Government and that of a private owner to 
pay laborers and suppliers.o It is in the owner's interest to see that the 
project is completed with a minimum of disruption and c!xpense, and 
this can best be accomplished by permitting the owner to pay the un-
paid bills. The court also indicated that allowing the surety to prevail 
on the payment bond was not inconsistent with the policy of the 
Massachusetts lien statutes. 
Thus, it may now be said that Massachusetts law on the conflicting 
rights of the assignee of contract rights and the surety has become 
simple and clear. The surety on both payment and performance bonds 
applicable to governmentaF and private contracts will have prior 
claim over the assignee to all sums due and retainages8 still in the 
hands of the owner at the time of the contractor's default. Apparently 
the bank will be entitled to retain all sums actually paid to it under 
the assignment. The Framingham Trust decision certainly affords 
adequate protection to the interests of the surety.9 Perhaps, however, 
the opinion does not adequately recognize the economic contribution 
made by banks which, in many instances, furnish the funds which 
permit builders to perform on their contracts. Banks will have to rely 
heavily upon the use of subordination agreements10 with sureties and 
provide, in those security agreements in which a continuing line of 
credit is extended, that the refusal of the surety to subordinate on any 
contract shall constitute a default. 
The most disturbing aspect of the assignee-surety situation is that it 
is not expressly covered by Article 9. Equitable subrogation can, of 
course, be recognized in an Article 9 case;11 however, the failure of the 
Code's draftsmen to explicitly provide for these important and not 
against government-owned real estate. See Hill v. American Surety Co., 200 U.S. 
197, 203 (1910). 
6 The court of appeals relied upon National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. New 
Amsterdam Cas. Co., cited in note 3 supra, which held that the surety's right of 
subrogation (1) survived enactment of the UCC in Massachusetts and (2) prevailed 
over the security interest of the bank in the unpaid balance. See Note, National 
Shawmut Bank: Another Step Toward Confusion in Surety Law, 64 Nw. U.L. Rev. 
582 (1969). 
7 See Speidel, "Stakeholder" Payments Under Federal Construc1tion Contracts: 
Payment Bond Surety vs. Assignee, 47 Va. L. Rev. 640 (1961); Note, 60 Yale L.J. 
548 (1951). It is settled that, in the case of an assignment involving a contract of the 
Federal Government, federal, not. state law will control the issue I){ priority. See 
Assignments of Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §203 (1964). 
s See 2 Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property §36.8 at 980 (1965), 
which suggests. that the proper balance is to allow the assignee to recover for 
sums earned by the contractor prior to default and the surety to enjoy priority 
as to retainages. 
9 See Cushman, The Surety's Right of Equitable Priority to Contract Balances in 
Relation to the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 Temple L.Q. 239 (1966). 
10 ucc §9-316. 
11 Id. §1-103. 
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unusual competing interests is surprising. It does not seem desirable 
to decide that the present Article 9 controls, and that the rights of the 
assignee and surety will depend upon which one was first to file a 
financing statement.12 It is submitted that Article 9 should be amended 
to treat the assignee-surety situation. In most cases, the surety should 
be afforded priority on funds still in the hands of the owner. 
§7.9. Bank's right of setoff. In Grant v. Colonial Bank & Trust 
Co.} a debtor delivered the savings account books, each in the amount 
of $10,000, to an escrow agent, or pledgee, to hold as security for the 
payment of three notes guaranteed by the plaintiffs. Defendant 
Colonial requested the debtor to increase the amount of his savings 
accounts in the bank, because he had been borrowing from defendant 
bank on unsecured notes since 1964; in response, debtor entered into 
a second arrangement by which he substituted the collateral of a 
Colonial bankbook for one of those bankbooks previously pledged to 
the account held by the escrow agent. This bankbook substitution was 
effected with the approval of the escrow agent and knowledge of the 
officers of Colonial. Thereafter, debtor defaulted on obligations to a 
creditor secured under the initial pledge and the escrow agent so 
informed Colonial. Three days later, the escrow agent requested that 
Colonial forward a check for the full amount of the account with ac-
cumulated interest. Colonial then accelerated its claims against debtor 
and notified the escrow agent that it had applied the entire amount of 
the savings account to debtor's obligations to the bank. In a suit for 
declaratory relief, the trial court found (1) that the security interest 
created by Colonial was subject to the prior rights of the plaintiffs and 
that Colonial had actual knowledge of the existence of such rights, and 
(2) that the escrow agent's possession of the disputed account "'created 
an interest in the intangible represented by the book.' "2 Accordingly, 
the trial court ordered Colonial to pay the full amount of the account, 
plus interest, to the escrow agent; defendant bank, it was ruled, had no 
right of setoff. 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court's 
final decree. Colonial's knowledge of the pledgee's equitable interests 
in the account was held dispositive of the case. The Court stated: 
It is decisive of this case that Colonial, through its president, 
knew of the security interest of the escrow agent at the creation of 
[the] account ... and, indeed, directly participated (for its own 
benefit in increasing its deposits) in substituting [one account for 
another] ... in which the escrow agent had a security interest. 
Because Colonial knew ... of the equitable security interest of the 
12 Id. §9-312(5). See Notes, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 927 (1965), 6 B.C. Ind. & Comm. 
L. Rev. 798 (1965). 
§7.9. 1 356 Mass. 392, 252 N.E.2d 339 (1969). 
2 Id. at-, 252 N.E.2d at 341·342, quoting the trial judge. 
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escrow agent, it ... could not appropriate by set-off the funds in 
the account as wholly the property of [the debtor] .... s 
The Court aptly noted that the evidence did not estab:tish that the 
defendant's claim had become payable at the time of the bankbook 
substitution or even that "the particular indebtedness (for which the 
appropriation was made) was in existence at all" when the agreement 
was executed.4 
Bankbook pledges are outside the scope of UCC Article 95• How-
ever, such pledges are recognized at common law and by statutes of 
the Commonwealth.s The depositary bank's right of setoff poses the 
greatest threat to the validity of this type of security. The law of Massa-
chusetts, even after Grant, remains open on the issue of whether-
and, if so, when- the bank may properly exercise the rlight of setoff 
of amounts on deposit in satisfaction of the depositor's indebtedness 
to it.7 The discussion of the Court in Grant suggests that Massachusetts 
courts may well decide that bankbooks are analogous to negotiable 
instruments or negotiable documents of title in the sense that an entire 
property interest is represented thereby. While such a v:iew of bank-
books would be novel, it might yield desirable results in light of the 
extensive use of bankbook pledges in Massachusetts and the possibility 
of surprise resulting from the bank's exercise of setoff. One lesson of 
Grant is that the pledgee of a bankbook should promptly notify the 
depositary bank of the existence of the pledge. Such notification would 
probably prevent the bank from effectively setting off loans which 
were made, or became due, subsequent to the time of the notice. 
Another case decided during the 1970 SuRVEY year which raises some 
interesting points about the bank's right of setoff is Bowling Green, 
Inc. v. State Street Bank & Trust Co.8 It is there suggested that, if the 
bank is a secured creditor, its right of setoff is circumscribed by a 
requirement that the security be inadequate. Also indicated is the pos-
sibility that the right of setoff may be affected by UCC Section 4-201, 
which makes the collecting bank an agent for the depositor rather 
than an owner of the item. It should be noted, however, that the 
section repudiates such a reading by providing that "any rights of 
the owner to proceeds of the item are subject to rights of a collecting 
bank such as those resulting from outstanding advances on the item 
and valid rights of setoff."9 
§7.10. UCC Article 8: Transfer of stock certificates. In New 
8 Id. at -, 252 N.E.2d at 343. 
4Ibid. 
5 ucc §9-J04(k). 
6 See G.L., c. 169, §6. 
7 See Forastiere v. Springfield lnst. for Savings, 303 Mass. 101, 20 N.l8:.2d 950 (1939). 
8 425 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1970). 
9 ucc §4-201(1). 
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England Merchants National Bank of Boston v. Old Colony Trust Co.,t 
Justice Spiegel of the Supreme Judicial Court rendered an informed 
and instructive opinion addressing the operation of VCC Article 8 
upon the transfer of investment securities. In an action to recover 
the amount represented by certificates of preferred and common stock 
of the defendant issuer, Associated Textile Companies, the plaintiff 
administrator took exception to a Superior Court ruling which sus-
tained the demurrer of the issuer and its transfer agent, Old Colony 
Trust Company. The pertinent factual allegations in plaintiff's decla-
ration were that the trustees of defendant issuer called for the redemp-
tion of preferred and common stock; that a partial liquidating dividend 
was declared; that, prior to the call, plaintiff's intestate had purchased 
shares of Associated Textile and received certificates indorsed in blank 
from his transferor; and that presentment was duly made by plaintiff 
to Old Colony and payment refused. The primary basis of the de-
fendants' demurrer was that neither plaintiff's intestate nor plaintiff 
had registered the transfer of ownership of the stock with the issuing 
company and, thus, the company's books and records "never reflected 
the transfer to [the] plaintiff's intestate and the true and lawful owner-
ship" of the stock.2 Accordingly, defendants contended that no action 
for a dividend can accrue to a transferee who fails to apply for a 
transfer of the registered ownership of the company's stock. 
As the Court aptly indicated, such an argument ignores the "over-
riding objective" of VCC Article 8, which "confers negotiability upon 
'securities governed by this Article.' "a The Court stated: 
Article 8 does not require that before a "holder" of securities 
can enforce rights under the securities he must be the "record 
owner" of those securities. A purchaser acquires the rights of his 
transferor [citing §8-301(1)]. Article 8 is first concerned with 
whether the instruments involved are securities within the defini-
tion expressed in §8-102(l)(a). In the instant case, the stock certi-
ficates are clearly "securities" and therefore fall within the ambit 
of §8-105(1).4 
As to the validity of the signatures on the securities in question, 
it was noted that no denial appeared in the pleadings. VCC Section 
8-105(2) provides in pertinent part: "In any action on a security (a) 
unless specifically denied in the pleadings, each signature on the 
security or in a necessary indorsement is admitted."5 And, once the 
signatures are admitted, "production of the instrument entitles a 
§7.10. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 57, 254 N.E.2d 891. 
2 Id. at 58, 254 N.E.2d at 892. 
3 Id. at 59, 254 N.E.2d at 893. The Court cited UCC §8-105(1), which states: "Se-
curities governed by this Article are negotiable instruments." 
4 Id. at 59, 60, 254 N.E.2d at 893. 
5 UCC §8·105(2)(a). 
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holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes a defense or a 
defect going to the validity of the security."6 Lastly, under UCC 
Section 8-308(2), an indorsement in blank of an investment security 
does not defeat the rights of its transferee.7 
§7.11. Legislative developments. Statutes of consequence to con-
sumer and banking interests were enacted during the 1970 regular ses-
sion of the Massachusetts legislature.1 One particularly significant 
statute, Chapter 457 of the Acts of 1970, further limits the rights of 
holders in due course within the context of consumer transactions.2 
6 Id. §8-105(2)(c). 
7 Concededly, in Palmer v. O'Bannon Corp., 253 Mass. 8, 149 N.E. 112 (1925), the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that a pledgee's rights to demand and receive new 
certificates and have the ownership of the stock registered in his name were de-
feated by his failure to fill in the blanks on the transferred certificates with his 
name. The Palmer view was propounded, however, prior to the 1958 adoption of 
the UCC in Massachusetts. 
§7.11. 1 See Chapter 9 for discussion of consumer protection le~~slation. Acts of 
1970, c. 135- amending G.L., c. 167 by deleting §52 (as amended by acts of 1964, 
c. 93) and inserting a new §52- provides more flexibility in bank closings; in 
rare instances, the determination of midnight deadline of finality of' payment might 
be affected. Acts of 1970, c. 126, amending G.L., c. 168, §38 by adding par. 9, 
authorizes savings banks to make mobile home loans. Acts of 1970, c. 197- amend-
ing G.L., c. 171, §24 by striking out subdiv. (D) (as added by Acts of 1967, c. 231, §3) 
and inserting a new subdiv. (D)- authorizes credit unions to make real estate 
improvement loans. Acts of 1970, c. 223, §§l-2, amending G.L., c. 170, §24, subsec. 
4 and 5, respectively, increase the time limit and percentage of value for real 
estate mortgages. 
2 Acts of 1970, c. 457, amending G.L., c. 255 by adding §12F: 
"As used in this section the following words shall, unless the context requires 
otherwise, have the following meanings: 
"'Organization,' a corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency, 
trust, estate, partnership, cooperative, or association. 
"'Person related to,' with respect to an individual means (a) the spouse of the 
individual, (b) a brother, brother-in-law, sister, or sister-in-law ole the individual, 
(c) an ancestor or lineal descendant of the individual or his spouse, and (d) any 
other relative, by blood or marriage, of the individual or his spous,e who shares the 
same home with the individual. 
"'Person related to,' with respect to an organization means (a) a person directly 
or indirectly controlling, controlled by or under common control with the organiza-
tion, (b) an officer or director of the organization or a person performing similar func-
tions with respect to the organization or to a person related to the organization, (c) the 
spouse of a person related to the organization, and (d) a relative by blood or 
marriage of a person related to the organization who shares the same home with 
him. 
"A creditor in consumer loan transactions shall be subject to all of the defenses 
of the borrower arising from the consumer sale or lease for which the proceeds of 
the loan are used, if the creditor knowingly participated in or was directly connected 
with the consumer sale or lease transaction. 
"Without limiting the scope of the preceding paragraph a creditor shall be 
deemed to have knowingly participated in or to have been directly connected 
with a consumer sale or lease transaction if: (a) he was a person related to the 
seller or lessor; (b) the seller or lessor prepared documents used in connection with 
the loan; (c) the creditor supplied forms to the seller or lessor which were used 
18
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By supplementing the provisions of G.L., c. 255, §l2C, eliminating 
holder in due course status for transferees of promissory notes executed 
in sales of consumer goods, the new section effectively precludes con-
tinuation of the common practice of avoiding existing prohibitions by 
simply referring the purchaser directly to the finance company for a 
loan of the purchase money. 
The new statute presents several problems of interpretation. In-
complete guidelines are provided for determining when the creditor 
"knowingly participated" in the consumer sale. On one hand, mere 
knowledge that the proceeds are to be used to purchase consumer 
goods apparently would not constitute knowing participation. On the 
other hand, the stated requirements for a creditor to have knowingly 
participated in, or become directly connected with, the consumer sale 
or lease are minimal. Difficulties of construction may be generated by 
the provision ascribing knowing participation to a creditor who "was 
specifically recommended by the seller or lessor to the borrower and 
made two or more loans in any calendar year, the proceeds of which are 
used in transactions with the same seller or lessor, or with a person 
related to the same seller or lessor." Under such language, it would 
seem possible that a consumer could include within the group of re-
commended financiers one of the major banks in the community which 
had no direct connection with the seller; and if that bank had made 
two loans in any calendar year, it would be subject to defenses good 
against the seller. An additional problem involves the apparent failure 
of the statute to prevent a subsequent transferee of the original 
creditor from becoming a holder in due course.3 
It is also noteworthy that, in the instance of a consumer loan made 
directly by the lending institution, the words "consumer note" would 
probably not be required to appear on the face of the note- such 
words rendering the instrument nonnegotiable under G.L., c. 255, 
§12C- because the creditor is not a retail seller.4 Thus, it would ap-
pear that, in transactions involving such direct loans, a transferee of a 
consumer loan note who satisfies all the requisites of holder in due 
course status takes the note free of any personal defenses which the 
consumer may have against his seller. 
In sum, it is clear that the vague language of the new section 
provides substantial latitude for judicial interpretation. An express 
by the consumer in obtaining the loan; (d) the creditor was specifically recom-
mended by the seller or lessor to the borrower and made two or more loans in any 
calendar year, the proceeds of which are used in transactions with the same seller 
or lessor, or with a person related to the same seller or lessor; or (e) the creditor 
was the issuer of a credit card which may be used by the consumer in the sale 
or lease transaction as a result of a prior agreement between the issuer and the 
seller or lessor." 
3 The term creditor is not defined in G.L., c. 255. The definition in G.L., c. 
HOC, §l(c) would not appear to include a transferee. 
4 See G.L., c. 255, §12C and G.L., c 255D, §1. 
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prohibition of avoidance of defenses in consumer sale and lease trans-
actions might have been more economic and desirable. 
Another significant legislative development of the 1970 SuRvEY 
year was the enactment of Massachusetts' first usury statute.5 The new 
act is very different from usury statutes of other jurisdictions. The 
typical legislative response to excessive interest charges has generally 
taken one of three forms: (1) declaring the entire loan void and un-
5 Acts of 1970, c. 826, amending G.L., c. 271 by adding §49: 
"(a) Whoever in exchange for either a loan of money or other property know-
ingly contracts for, charges, takes or receives, directly or indirectly, interest and ex-
penses the aggregate of which exceeds an amount greater than twenty per centum 
per annum upon the sum loaned or the equivalent rate for a lolllger or shorter 
period, shall be guilty of criminal usury and shall be punished by imprisonment 
in the state prison for not more than ten years or by a fine of not more than ten 
thousand dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment. For the purposes of this 
section the amount to be paid upon any loan for interest or expense's shall include 
all sums paid or to be paid by or on behalf of the borrower for interest, 
brokerage, recording fees, commissions, services, extension of loan, forbearance to 
enforce payment, and all other sums charged against or paid or to be paid by the 
borrower for making or securing directly or indirectly the loan, and shall include 
all such sums when paid by or on behalf of or charged against the borrower 
for or on account of making or securing the loan, directly or indirectly, to or by 
any person, other than the lender, if such payment or charge was known to the 
lender at the time of making the loan, or might have been ascertained by reason-
able inquiry. 
"(b) Whoever, with knowledge of the contents thereof, possesses any writing, 
paper, instrument or article used to record a transaction proscribed under the 
provisions of paragraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment in a jail or house 
of correction for not more than two and one half years, or by a fine of not more 
than five thousand dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
"(c) Any loan at a rate of interest proscribed under the provisions of paragraph 
(a) may be declared void by the supreme judicial or superior court in equity upon 
petition by the person to whom the loan was made. 
"(d) The provisions of paragraphs (a) to (c), inclusive, shall not apply to any 
person who notifies the attorney general of his intent to engage in a transaction or 
transactions which, but for the provisions of this paragraph, would be proscribed 
under the provisions of paragraph (a) providing any such person maintains 
records of any such transaction. Such notification shall be valid for a two year period 
and shall contain the person's name and accurate address. No lender shall publicly 
advertise the fact of such notification nor use the fact of such notifit:ation to solicit 
business, except that such notification may be revealed to an individual upon his 
inquiry. Illegal use of such notification shall be punished by a fine of one thousand 
dollars. Such records shall contain the name and address of the borrower, the 
amount borrowed, the interest and expenses to be paid by the borrower, the date 
the loan is made and the date or dates on which any payment is due. Any 
such records shall be made available to the attorney general for the purposes of 
inspection upon his request. Such records and their contents shall be confidential 
but may be used by the attorney general, or any district attorney with the approval 
of the attorney general, for the purposes of conducting any criminal proceeding to 
which such records or their contents are relevant. 
"(e) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any loan the rate of in-
terest for which is regulated under any other provision of general or special law 
or regulations promulgated thereunder or to any corporation subject to control, 
regulation or examination by any state or federal agency." 
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collectible; (2) making only the interest element collectible; or (3) 
reducing the interest recoverable to the legal rate. The Massachusetts 
usury statute provides for severe criminal punishment for interest 
charges in excess of 20 percent per year, and reposes equitable 
jurisdiction in the Supreme Judicial Court and Superior Court to 
declare any loan with a proscribed rate of interest void upon petition 
of the recipient of such a loan. It is important to note the use of the 
words "may be declared void ... "; presumably the court in equity 
might also decree lesser restrictions on the collectibility of the loan. 
Corporate borrowers are expressly excluded from the protection of the 
statute. 
Subsection (d) of the new usury statute is the heart of the act. It is 
there provided that the criminal sanctions of the law shall not apply to 
any person who notifies the attorney general of his intent to engage 
in transactions which would otherwise violate the section. It would 
appear, then, that a lender may avoid the effects of the statute simply 
by notifying the office of the attorney general. The apparent purpose 
of subsection (d) is to facilitate proof of criminal violations by loan 
sharks and dishonest lenders, who, by failing to file and continuing to 
lend at exorbitant interest rates, will subject themselves to imprison-
ment for not more than ten years andjor fine of not more than $10,000. 
While the existence of this subsection might constitute some degree 
of psychological deterrence to the loan shark, it is doubtful that the 
activities of such lenders will be significantly circumscribed thereby. 
Most dishonest lenders probably will not register, will continue to 
charge high rates of interest and will employ coercion and violence if 
necessary to collect their loans. In addition, the concept of registra-
tion might well generate problems of self-incrimination similar to 
those related to the federal occupational tax on wagering.6 
Illusory statutes which purport to deal with a field of great social 
importance, such as excessive interest charges, tend to mislead the 
public into reliance upon false legal remedies. It can convincingly be 
argued that the previous absence of a usury statute in Massachusetts 
was beneficial to the legitimate segment of the financing industry. On 
balance, and in view of the imposition of maximum statutory limits 
in the most important areas of consumer transactions,7 perhaps it is 
undesirable to set a general statutory maximum on interest charges. 
In any case, it would seem undesirable to enact a usury statute which 
is, in operative effect, a nullity. 
STUDENT CoMMENT 
§7.12. Employer protection: Restraints on competition by former 
employees. When one sells his business, he is in a position to deliver 
6 26 U.S.C. §§4411, 4412, 6801·6808 (1964); see Marchetti v. United States, 390 
u.s. 39 (1968). 
7 See, e.g., G.L., c. 140, §100 and G.L., c. 255D, §11. 
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to a buyer more than just real estate or goods. He can also deliver the 
business's "good will," which may be defined in economic terms as 
the probability that satisfied and loyal customers will continue their 
patronage after the ownership has changed hands.1 If the buyer of a 
business wants the benefit of this established clientele, the price he 
pays for the business will include a dollar value for the intangible 
good will. Having agreed to purchase this customer favor, the buyer 
will want to protect it from interference in order to secure the full 
value of the business. Most often he will require a covenant in the 
sales contract whereby the vendor agrees not to engage i][l a competi-
tive business for a specified time within a designated geographical 
area. Leasing contracts would be subject to the same considerations 
described above for sales. 
Covenants not to compete are also used in employment situations. 
An employer may wish to protect his business from economic harm at 
the hands of former employees, particularly those who ha.ve had close 
contacts with customers or access to confidential information during 
their employment. To protect his business interests, the employer may 
require certain employees to sign a noncompetition covenant. Therein 
the employee agrees that after termination of his employment for 
any reason, he will not work for a competitor of his present employer, 
or set up a competing business for himself, for a specified time and 
within a described geographical area. Unlike the buyer of a business, 
however, an employer does not need the restrictive covenant to se-
cure for himself the full value of what he acquires by contract, for 
what he acquires is the current service of an employee. Instead, the 
employer looks ahead to his need for protection against the actions 
of former employees.2 The employee seldom bargains for his covenant 
not to compete, nor does he usually receive any additional compen-
sation for his agreement. His restrictive covenant, on the contrary, is 
a price that he pays for his employment, and his continuing employ-
ment is consideration for the agreement. 
Before the seventeenth century, English common law treated non-
competition covenants as offensive to the principle of economic 
freedom and therefore unenforceable. 11 No particular effort was made 
to distinguish between covenants made by a business vendor and those 
made by an employee, for both types were held to be void.4 Among 
the first decisions in England that broke with tradition and upheld a 
restraint on competition, the most influential was Mitchell v. 
§7.12. 1 Black's Law Dictionary 823 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). See also Edgecomb v. 
Edmonston, 257 Mass. 12, 19, 153 N.E. 99, 101 (1926): "the tendency, from habit, 
of customers to resort to the plaintiff to obtain the services which he furnished 
and they were accustomed to receive at his office .... " 
2 The obligation not to compete during the term of employment is derived from 
general agency principles. Restatement of Agency Second §393 (1958). 
3 Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 631-632 
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Blake]. 
4 Carpenter, Validity of Contracts Not to Compete, 76 U. Pa. L. Rev. 244 (1928). 
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Reynolds.5 Decided in I7ll, that case involved a covenant which had 
been made incident to the lease of a bakery for five years. The bakery 
was in a small town, and the lessor had agreed not to compete in the 
baker's trade in that town for the duration of the lease. In upholding 
the covenant, the court reasoned in terms of an economic way of life 
very different from our own. The court's treatment of the issues, 
however, remains surprisingly similar to the treatment such issues 
receive today in most American jurisdictions. 
The court in Mitchell v. Reynolds viewed the common law's re-
jection of noncompetition agreements as based on the "mischief" they 
created. In particular, the court pointed out that restraints on com-
petition had limited value even to the person who sought them,6 while 
these restraints might deprive a man of his livelihood and the public 
of a useful worker. This idea of balancing the interests of covenantor, 
covenantee, and the public is still the basis upon which most Ameri-
can courts determine the validity of a given covenant. The court in 
Mitchell v. Reynolds stated that it would continue to reject any cov-
enant wherein a person agreed not to exercise his trade in any part 
of England. No man was felt to need such broad economic protection 
in those times unless he was trying to form a monopoly, and forming 
a monopoly was a crime. The circumstances in Mitchell v. Reynolds, 
however, impressed the court as being different. There the lessee had 
required a covenant against competition which applied only to a 
small town and only for the duration of the lease. Such a limited re-
straint was determined by the court to be useful to the lessee and 
reasonable for the lessor. Consideration for the lessor's covenant was 
"good and adequate" in view of the price paid for the bakery lease. 
For these reasons the covenant was enforced, and the Court of Queen's 
Bench announced its intention to base future decisions on the facts 
in each case. "If ... it appears to be a just and honest contract, it 
ought to be maintained."7 
Most American courts distinguish, primarily on the grounds dis-
cussed above, between a vendor's covenant incident to the sale of his 
business with its good will and an employee's covenant which is made 
part of his employment contract.s Vendor covenants are more readily 
enforced by the courts because of the bargain and exchange for value 
which usually takes place between the parties.9 Employee covenants, 
on the other hand, are viewed less favorably. American courts gen-
eraly feel that there is unequal bargaining power in favor of the em-
ployer, and that freedom of employment should not be restricted 
51 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711). 
6 Id. at 190-191, 24 Eng. Rep. at 350: "(f]or what does it signify to a tradesman in 
London, what another does at Newcastle? ... " Apparently London and Newcastle 
were competitive strangers in 1711. 
7 Id. at 197, 24 Eng. Rep. at 352. 
8 Blake, supra note 3, at 646. 
9 Id. at 647, 648. 
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unless necessary.1o The circumstances which may justify a restraint on 
freedom of employment will be considered later. 
This comment will be limited to an examination of those covenants 
not to compete which apply to employer-employee situations. Be-
cause such covenants are enforced for the benefit of the employer, if 
they are enforced at all, it will be necessary to consider not only the 
economic interests which American courts have traditionally allowed 
employers to protect, but also the advantages of noncompetition agree-
ments over other means of employer protection. The major portion 
of this comment will be concerned with the standards that American 
courts have come to apply in determining the enforceability of post-
employment restraints, with particular emphasis on the position 
adopted by the courts in Massachusetts. 
Employers have had some measure of common law protection for 
their legitimate business interests, even apart from the me of coven-
ants not to compete. The law of unfair competition, for example, 
protects trade secrets and certain customer data to which an em-
ployee has had access during employment. An employer, however, 
faces certain problems in relying on the law of unfair competition for 
relief.U As a prerequisite to recovering damages or obtaining equitable 
relief, he must prove that specific information qualifies as a trade se-
cret,l2 and that the information has been disclosed to his economic 
detriment. The employer must also demonstrate that what has been 
disclosed was not otherwise available to competitors through legal 
sources of information. These same evidentiary problems exist if the 
employer seeks to prove the misuse of certain customer data. 
Another source of protection for the employer's business interests,. J. ... 
absent a covenant not to compete, is the use of a covenant whereby -
the employee agrees specifically not to disclose confidellltial informa-
tion learned on the job. After termination of an employment relation-
ship, the employee would be free to work for a competing business as 
long as he honors his agreement not to disclose such information.13 
This approach has been justifiably criticized as ineffective to protect 
an employer even from the actions of a former employee who attempts 
in good faith to honor his covenant.14 The conscientious work per-
10 Ibid. See also Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 62 
Ohio L. Abs. 17, 45·46, 105 N.E.2d 685, 704 (C.P. 1952). 
11 "Because of its inordinate complexity, the law of trade secrets is unpredictable 
even within a particular jurisdiction .... " Note, The Trade Secret Quagmire- A 
Proposed Federal Solution, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 1049 (1966). See also Restatement of 
Torts §757, comment b (1939): "A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, 
device or complication of information which is used in one's business, and which 
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not 
know or use it. It may be ... a list of customers." 
12 Blake, supra note 3, at 668, 671. 
13 This position was advocated in Note, Contracts in Restraint of Trade: Em-
ployee Covenants Not to Compete, 21 Ark. L. Rev. 214 (1967). 
14 Blake, supra note 3, at 669·670. 
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formed for a competitor by the former employee will inevitably com-
promise his good intentions. The employee cannot be expected to 
distinguish in his performance between what he has learned as con-
fidential information and what he knows from his own general skills 
and knowledge. His work will disclose the full range of his ex-
perience, and his success in the new job will depend on full use of his 
talents. Policing of a covenant not to disclose confidential information 
would be virtually impossible. In Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. Shev-
rin, 15 a former employee of the plaintiff company had signed both 
a covenant not to compete and a separate covenant not to disclose 
trade secrets. The ineffectiveness of the latter covenant was shown by 
evidence that the employee had disclosed information concerning con-
fidential industrial processes. The Supreme Judicial Court recognized 
the difficulty of monitoring or preventing further wrongdoing if the 
employee were allowed to work for a competitor of plaintiff company. 
The Court, therefore, upheld the noncompetition agreement as the 
only meaningful protection available to his former employer. 
Faced with the ineffectiveness of the other forms of economic pro-
tection noted above, employers have come to rely on the use of cove-
nants not to compete. A typical agreement might recite that after 
termination of his employment for any reason, the contracting em-
ployee will not work in the same or a similar business, either for him-
self or for anyone else, within a designated geographical area and for 
a specified period of time. Such an agreement is easier to police and 
is more effective, from the employer's point of view, than a covenant 
not to disclose confidential information, for he need only monitor the 
subsequent business associations of contracting employees. Proving that 
certain information has been misused is not necessary. In addition, 
the use of an employment restraint precludes the problems of proof 
mentioned above in connection with the law of unfair competition. 
For an employer, then, employee covenants not to compete are a 
primary source of economic protection. These covenants, however, 
are enforced as exceptions to the general rule against restraints of 
trade.16 Consequently, those who devise employment restraints must 
not seek to impose terms which overstep the boundaries which a 
particular jurisdiction has set. The court in Mitchell v. Reynolds, for 
example, announced its intention to hold void any restraint which 
applied over the whole of England. That same court was willing to 
enforce a limited covenant which it felt to be both useful to the cove-
nantee and reasonable for the covenantor. The balancing of interests 
proposed by the court in Mitchell v. Reynolds has been adopted by 
most American jurisdictions as a test of "reasonableness-" The Massa-
chusetts expression of this test is fairly typical: 
It has long been settled in this Commonwealth that a covenant 
15 342 Mass. 714, 175 N.E.2d 374 (1961). 
16 Blake, supra note 3, at 626. 
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inserted in a contract for personal service restricting tra.de or com-
petition or freedom of employment is not invalid and may be 
enforced in equity provided it is necessary for the protection of 
the employer, is reasonably limited in time and space, and is 
consonant with the public interest. What is reasonable depends on 
the facts in each case.17 
Like most expressions of the "reasonableness" test, the :Massachusetts 
formulation is an outline which must be expanded by judicial de-
cisions. The Massachusetts formulation does, however, put the em-
ployer on notice that he must look to equity for specific enforcement 
of a covenant not to compete. This is a reminder, in elfect, that the 
court will look beyond the terms of the covenant and consider all the 
circumstances of the case, including the conduct of the parties. A 
case in point is Economy Grocery Stores Corp. v. McMenamy,lB where 
the employee was manager of the meat department in a grocery 
store. The noncompetition covenant which he had signed was to 
apply for one year after the voluntary or involuntary termination of 
his employment. The covenant required that the employee refrain 
from engaging in "any branch of the grocery, meat andfor food supply 
business" within two miles of any store operated by the employer. The 
meat manager performed well in his job, but was fired without 
cause "and in circumstances involving some humiliation to him."19 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the employer had arbitrarily 
and unreasonably discharged the employee, even though the covena~t 
allowed for involuntary termination of employment. Remarking that 
"[s]pecific performance ... will not be granted if the conduct of the 
plaintiff [employer] is savored with injustice,"20 the Court refused to 
enforce the otherwise reasonable covenant. 
The Massachusetts formulation of the "reasonableness" test in-
cludes, as its first element, the requirement that the cov(:nant in ques-
tion be "necessary for the protection of the employer." Massachusetts 
and most other American jurisdictions regard a covenant as necessary 
if it is intended in good faith to protect confidential information or 
established customer relationships. Where a company's training pro-
gram for its salesmen was similar to programs used by three compet-
ing businesses, the Supreme Judicial Court refused to treat the training 
as confidential information21 and held, therefore, that the salesman's 
covenant was not enforceable. But where certain industrial processes 
were unknown to either competitors or customers, the processes were 
17 Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. Shevrin, 342 Mass. 714, 716, 175 N.E.2d 374, 375-
376 (1961). 
18 290 Mass. 549, 195 N.E. 747 (1935), cited in Slade Gorton &: Co. v. O'Neil, 355 
Mass. 4, 9, 242 N.E.2d 551, 554 (1968), in connection with the Court's assumption 
that O'Neil's employment agreement "was not inherently unfair .... " 
19 290 Mass. 549, 551, 195 N.E. 747, 748 (1935). 
20 Id. at 552, 195 N.E. at 748. 
21 Club Aluminum Co. v. Young, 263 Mass. 223, 160 N.E. 804 (1.928). 
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~onsidered confidential information, and a post-employment restraint 
of three years was upheld.22 
A company's favor with its established customers will always be 
vulnerable to normal competition by other businesses, and the Massa· 
chusetts courts will not interfere to protect a company from normal 
competition.23 A former employee, however, might be in a better po-
sition to divert those established customers than other competitors 
would be, especially if he had extensive and personal customer con-
tact during his employment. The courts in Massachusetts· examine 
both the extent of the former employee's competitive advantage and 
the probability that at some point in time the advantage will diminish, 
leaving him a normal competitor. In Whiting Milk Cos. v. O'Con· 
nell,24 the covenant in question restrained all the company's milk 
wagon drivers from selling any competitor's dairy products for a period 
of 90 days after termination of employment. The Supreme Judicial 
Court held that a milk wagon driver would gain a competitive ad-
vantage from his employment only with those customers whom he had 
actually served. The 90-day restraint. therefore, was limited by the 
Court to the solicitation of those customers. But in New England Tree 
Expert Co. v. Russell,25 the Court upheld as necessary a restraint of 
three years which applied to areas "covered intensively" by other 
members of the company's sales force. The employee in that case had 
worked as a general salesman for the "arboricultural" services of the 
company, and had set up a competing business of his own after ter-
minating his employment. The Court held that the employee had 
gained sufficient general customer information during his employ-
ment to provide a special competitive advantage in his own business. 
Counsel for the former salesman cited cases such as Whiting Milk 
Cos. v. O'Connell and contended that in Massachusetts a restraint was 
to be limited to an employee's former territory.26 The Court dis-
agreed: 
... There is ... no such established principle of law in this 
Commonwealth. The test is reasonableness .... [T]hose cases con-
cerned businesses where the routes upon which the employee had 
worked for the employer were the important element, and where 
the relief granted was sufficient to afford reasonable protection to 
the good will of the business involved.27 
The Supreme Judicial Court has consistently refused to be bound by 
any fixed definition of reasonableness. What is a proper restraint for 
22 Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. Shevrin, 342 Mass. 714, 175 N.E.2d 374 (1961). 
23 Richmond Bros., Inc. v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
337, 342, 256 N.E.2d 304, 307. 
24277 Mass. 570, 179 N.E. 169 (1931). 
2!1 306 Mass. 804, 28 N.E.2d 997 (1940). 
26 Id. at 810, 28 N.E.2d at 1000. 
!!7 Ibid. 
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a milk wagon driver may clearly not be a guideline for one of a 
company's seven general sales representatives. 
Naturally, not all post-employment restraints pass the test of reason-
ableness. What is a court to do when it finds that one or more terms 
of an employee's covenant are unreasonable? The question is answered 
differently among the jurisdictions, but generally one of three ap-
proaches is followed. The first is to deny enforcement of the entire 
covenant if any part is found unreasonable. The few jurisdictions 
which take this approach rely on the policy that courts have no 
authority to vary the terms of a written agreement.28 A covenant stands 
or falls in its entirety, even though the court might feel that some 
reasonable restraint should be salvaged from the unreasonable terms. 
This "all or nothing" approach lumps together those employers who 
frame intentionally oppressive covenants and those who try, in good 
faith, to anticipate only so much protection as they believe they will 
need at some time in the future. For example, consider the problem 
of an employer who hires an engineer to oversee the development of 
confidential manufacturing processes. In deciding on terms for a non-
competition agreement, the employer must allow for future con-
tingencies and attempt to forecast the future relationship of the 
engineer to the company. Certain terms for the covenant would be 
reasonable early in the employment, but those terms might be un-
reasonable six months or a year after the engineer has begun work. 
In addition, otherwise reasonable terms might be rendered unneces-
sary and unreasonable if later a competitor developed processes similar 
to those which the employer had considered confidential. Frequently 
changing factors would necessitate frequently amended covenants. 
As the number of affected employees increased, so also would the 
administrative burden of revising covenants. 
A second approach to the disposition of unreasonable covenants is 
referred to as the "blue pencil rule."29 If the covenant is so worded 
that the excessive terms can be crossed out and the remaining terms 
are sufficient to constitute a clear and valid covenant, the modified 
covenant will be enforced. The blue pencil rule allows a court to en-
force what it feels are reasonable terms, but only if the terms of the 
covenant are severable. For example, if a court found unreasonable a 
restraint on competition "within the state of Connecticut,·· blue-pencil-
ling could not be applied, for crossing out "within the state of Connect-
icut" would leave no territory designated in which the covenant could 
be enforced. On the other hand, if the unreasonable restraint was on 
competition "in Stamford, Greenwich, Darien and Bridgeport," and 
the court felt that a restraint limited to Greenwich would be reason-
28 "[C]ourts have no authority to vary the terms of a written agreement, for to do 
so would simply be to make a new contract between the parties. Vve have repeat-
edly held that this will not be done." Brown v. Devine, 240 Ark. 838, 842, 402 
S.W.2d 669, 672 (1966). 
29 6A Corbin, Contracts §1390 at 66-68 (1962). 
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able, the other three area names could be deleted. Because time pro-
visions in a covenant are generally not severable, the blue pencil rule 
cannot be used to reduce them.3o If a covenant is to operate "for three 
years," any crossing out will eliminate the entire provision. 
The blue pencil rule involves the court in a mechanical exercise, 
limiting its reforming powers on the basis of whether a covenant is 
sufficiently severable. Yet this approach appears to have been the 
majority position at one time, and it is followed in the Restatement 
of Contracts.31 
The third approach to unreasonable covenants marks a trend away 
from the limitations of the blue pencil rule. It seems that in a majority 
of American jurisdictions, including Massachusetts, courts prefer to 
reform the covenant as a whole, without regard to the severability of 
its terms.32 On the facts in each case, the court decides what re-
straint would be reasonable and enforces that restraint. The court 
will not, however, reform the covenant to include terms which exceed 
those agreed to by the parties. This third approach has been criticized 
as inviting employers to fashion onerous and excessive covenants, 
secure in the knowledge that the courts will enforce whatever the 
courts feel is reasonable.33 The excessive restraints thus serve to in-
timidate those employees who respect their contractual obligations and 
those who cannot afford the costs of litigation. Competitors may also 
fear legal complications and refuse to hire a person who has a non-
competition covenant hanging over his head. 
The above criticisms would be valid if a jurisdiction made no at-
tempt to examine the circumstances surrounding the covenant and the 
actions of the parties. However, the equity powers of a court are 
broad enough to deny relief to wrongdoers. As previously noted, 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has held an otherwise 
reasonable covenant unenforceable because of the arbitrary and un-
reasonable firing of the employee.34 It seems logical that the Court 
could also hold invalid a covenant which it found deliberately un-
reasonable and oppresive. The Supreme Judicial Court should make 
clear its intention to deny any enforcement where there is credible 
evidence that the employer failed to make a good faith attempt to 
fashion reasonable terms for the covenant. 
The legislatures in some states have taken what might be listed as a 
fourth approach to the problem of unreasonable covenants: statutory 
restrictions on all restraints of employment.35 Such restrictions gen-
30 Kreider, Trends in the Enforcement of Restrictive Employment Contracts, 35 U. 
Cinn. L. Rev. 16, 25 (1966). 
31 Restatement of Contracts §518 (1932). 
32 Professor Corbin considered this to be the best-reasoned approach. See 6A 
Corbin, Contracts §1390 at 70-74 (1962). 
33 Blake, supra note 3, at 682-683. 
34 Economy Grocery Stores Corp. v. McMenamy, 290 Mass. 549, 195 N.E. 747 
(1935). 
35 For example, North Dakota, Oklahoma and Montana prohibit all employee 
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erally work against an employer, for they limit his ability to fashion 
what he believes in good faith to be necessary protection for his 
economic interests. The economic realities of his business and the 
nature of his employee's position may require a type of :restraint not 
permitted by statute. Given the employment mobility and the em-
phasis upon competitive advantage in our economic system, restrictive 
statutes seem ill-adapted to the complex business relationships that 
have become commonplace. It is submitted that a rigid attempt to 
deal with the question of employment restraints ignores the inherent 
right in our system to protect and nurture one's economic interests. 
In the 1970 SuRVEY year the Supreme Judicial Court has again con-
sidered its test of reasonableness in determining the validity of an 
employee's covenant not to compete. The precedents established over 
a period of 40 years were followed in Richmond Brothers, Inc. v. 
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.36 Defendant Jacoby, also known as 
Jerry Williams, was hired in 1957 by Boston radio station WMEX 
(Richmond Brothers, Inc.) as a radio announcer. When he left for a 
position in Chicago on August 28, 1965, Williams was the moderator 
of a successful talk show on WMEX. He was under contract to the 
station until 1967, and in negotiating a new contract which ter-
minated his employment with WMEX, Williams agreed "not to en-
gage in any employment in radio, television, or adverti~:ing in New 
England until October, 1970." Williams returned to Boston and 
began broadcasting for radio station WBZ (Westinghouse) on July 29, 
1968. 
The issue facing the Court was whether to enforce the covenant 
which the parties had signed in 1965. HELD: That the enforcement 
of the restraint was no longer reasonably necessary for the protection 
of plaintiff's business. In answering the contention of ·wMEX that 
Williams had signed a covenant reasonable in duration, the Supreme 
Judicial Court said, in effect, that what was reasonable in 1965 might 
not be reasonable three years later. Plaintiff did not claim that the 
time provision was needed because Williams had been given access to 
confidential information during his employment; the station's po-
sition apparently centered on the need to protect established cus-
tomer relationships. As the Court recognized in its opinion, the 
customers of a radio station are its advertisers. PlaintiJf, therefore, 
needed to demonstrate that some of its advertisers had been solicited 
by Williams, or that his affiliation with another radio station would 
be likely to draw customers from WMEX. Yet the Court found, on 
covenants not to compete. N.D. Cent. Code §9-08-06 (1959); Okla .. Stat. tit. 15, 
§§217-219 (1961); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§13-807 through 13-809 (1967). In Loui-
siana a covenant is permitted only if the employer incurs an expense in training 
the employee or in advertising the employee's connection with the business. Still, 
the time limit of the covenant must not exceed two years, and the retrictions can 
extend only over the territory or routes actually covered by the employer's busi-
ness. La. Rev. Stat. §23:921 (1950). 
36 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 337, 2!l6 N.E.2d !104. 
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the contrary, that Williams had never contacted any WMEX or WBZ 
advertisers. Plaintiff also failed to present evidence that it had lost 
any advertising sponsors when Williams left WMEX or when he 
returned to Boston and began broadcasting for WBZ. In short, plaintiff 
failed to present evidence that the covenant was still necessary for the 
protection of its business. 
The Court was thus able to phrase its decision in Richmond Broth-
ers v. Westinghouse in terms of a limited statement: "We are of the 
opinion that the restrictive covenant in the 1965 contract is no longer 
reasonably necessary .... "37 (Emphasis added.) It was not necessary to 
decide whether the restraint was reasonable when signed, or whether 
a restraint of three years would have been found reasonable if the 
case had arisen in 1966 or 1967. However, the Court cited with ap-
proval the language of its decision in Club Aluminum Co. v. Young:3B 
... [A]n employer cannot by contract prevent his employee 
from using the skill and intelligence acquired or increased and 
improved through experience or through instruction received in 
the course of the employment. The employee may achieve superi-
ority in his particular department by every lawful means at hand, 
and then, upon the rightful termination of his contract for ser-
vice, use that superiority for the benefit of rivals in trade of his 
former employer.39 
If the Court had been presented with the fact situation of the Rich-
mond case soon after the covenant was signed, it seems likely that the 
covenant would have been enforced only long enough to render 
Williams an ordinary competitor for WMEX's advertisers, if it were 
enforced at all. The Court might well have considered a year's re-
straint as sufficient protection for WMEX. 
In the past 40 years the Supreme Judicial Court has not enforced 
a restrictive employment covenant for a duration longer than three 
years, and that maximum has been upheld in only three cases during 
the period. It is notable that in each instance the facts showed 
wrongdoing on the part of the former employee, which plaintiff 
WMEX failed to demonstrate in Richmond Brothers v. Westinghouse. 
In one of the three cases the employee had started his own business, 
supplying the same kind of service as did his former employer, after 
which he solicited customers of the former employer.4o In another 
case the employee went to work for a competitor, actively solicited 
customers of his former employer, and disclosed confidential indus-
trial processes which were vital to his former employer.41 In the third 
case where a three-year term was upheld (having been reduced from 
37 ld. at 342, 256 N.E.2d at 307. 
38 263 Mass. 223, 160 N.E. 804 (1928). 
39 Id. at 226-227, 160 N.E. at 806. 
40 New England Tree Expert Co. v. Russell, 306 Mass. 804, 28 N.E.2d 997 (1940). 
41 Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. Shevrin, 342 Mass. 714, 175 N.E.2d 374 (1961). 
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five years), a district sales representative had begun soliciting clients 
of his former employer less than a week after resigning his position.42 
Although employee wrongdoing was apparent in the aforementioned 
three cases, that element was not present in Richmond Brothers_ v. 
Westinghouse. If Williams had bequn broadcasting on WBZ one or 
two years after leaving WMEX, the Court might well have decided 
that even a three-year covenant would be unnecessary, considering the 
facts of the case and previous Massachusetts decisions. 
Even if the time provision of five years in Williams's covenant had 
been upheld, the Court, it is submitted, would probably have found 
the scope of the restraint excessive and unreasonable. vVilliams was 
a radio personality with WMEX, yet his covenant restrained him 
from "any employment in radio, television, or advertising." Presum-
ably he could not, under those terms, accept a position as a television 
sports announcer or as personnel director for an advertising firm. It is 
questionable whether exclusion from those jobs would be necessary to 
protect WMEX from economic harm. If the scope of the restraint had 
been in issue, the Supreme Judicial Court, applying its test of 
reasonableness, would probably have pared the restrictive terms con-
siderably. 
Massachusetts was among the first American jurisdictions to reform 
and enforce an employee's covenant according to a court of equity's 
determination of what would be reasonable. In Richmond Brothers v. 
Westinghouse, the Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed its adherence 
to this approach. Those practitioners who draft employee covenants 
not to compete have the assurance that the Massachusetts courts will 
not discard an entire covenant if one or more terms are found un-
reasonable. As has been suggested, however, this assurance seems 
predicated on the good faith effort of the employer to frame reason-
able covenants. The employer should also take care to require these 
covenants only of employees whose later competition is likely to 
present an economic threat to his business. Such care can itself be 
offered as evidence that the employer regularly requires restrictive 
covenants only where necessary. If he has only a few affected em-
ployees, the employer should try to tailor the agreements to each. ) 
Where this would be impractical, he should fashion the covenants 
with a reasonable classification of employees in mind. Because it is 
in the best interests of the employer to avoid unnecessary litigation, 
he should also be willing to revise the terms of a covenant when those 
terms appear to be more than is necessary for his protection. A willing-
ness to revise excessive restraints would be especially important at the 
time an employment relationship is terminated. 
There may be a need to seek enforcement of a noncompetition 
covenant in a jurisdiction which applies the "blue pencil rule." If 
this is a possibility, the employer should separate the terms of the 
42 Wrentham Co. v. Cann, 345 Mass. 737, 189 N.E.2d 559 (1963). 
32
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1970 [1970], Art. 10
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1970/iss1/10
§7.12 COMMERCIAL LAW 141 
agreement into severable elements. Special care must be taken to 
ensure that the time provision is not excessive, for it is not logically 
severable, and the whole covenant may fall if the duration is found 
unreasonable. An employer should be particularly willing, therefore, 
to review the time provision when an employee leaves and to revise 
it if it then seems excessive. 
The Massachusetts test of reasonableness, as elaborated in judicial 
decisions, appears well suited to provide legitimate economic pro-
tection for employers and minimal interference with an employee's 
right to seek the best job for himself. As with any subjective test, it 
will be difficult to predict what terms a court of equity will con-
sider reasonable in a particular case. An employer's best hope, since 
the covenant is intended for his protection, is in making its terms 
reflect only his actual needs. 
TIMOTHY D. JAROCH 
33
Carroll: Chapter 7: Commercial Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1970
